Banking Leverage Procyclicality: A Theoretical Model Introducing Currency Diversification by Pedrono, Justine
Banking Leverage Procyclicality: A Theoretical Model
Introducing Currency Diversification
Justine Pedrono
To cite this version:
Justine Pedrono. Banking Leverage Procyclicality: A Theoretical Model Introducing Currency
Diversification. 2015. <halshs-01203758v2>
HAL Id: halshs-01203758
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01203758v2
Submitted on 17 Feb 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Working Papers / Documents de travail
WP 2015 - Nr 39
Banking Leverage Procyclicality: 
A Theoretical Model Introducing Currency Diversification
Justine Pedrono
Banking leverage procyclicality: a theoretical model
introducing currency diversification.
Justine Pedrono
Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS
justine.pedrono@univ-amu.fr
July 13, 2015
Work in progress1
abstract:
The brutal adjustments to global banks’ balance sheets in the wake of the recent
economic crisis have rekindled interest in the procyclicality of banking leverage. During
economic bursts, the collateral value of banks decreases and their risk-taking capacity is
reduced. Banks raise less funds and their leverage - defined as total assets over equity -
goes down: the leverage is procyclical. The paper investigates the procyclicality of bank
leverage when banks can borrow and invest in two different currencies, as with European
banks. To the extent that shocks are asymmetric, we find that currency diversification
of assets reduces the procyclicality of the leverage and that a floating exchange rate
increases the risk-taking capacity of banks.
JEL classification: F3, F4, G15
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1 Introduction
The procyclicality of bank leverage is related to models of financial accelerators devel-
oped by Bernanke and Gertler [1989] and Kiyotaki and Moore [1997]. Financial distress,
characterized by large declines in asset prices, decreases banks’ net worth and increases
their funding costs. This results in an endogenous process which is a major factor in
depressed economic activity.
The development experienced by banks pre-crisis, followed by the crisis downturn,
have recently drawn attention to bank leverage adjustments. According to Adrian and
Shin [2013], the leverage of banks, defined as the ratio of total assets to equity, is
procyclical: it rises in good times and falls in downturns. This procyclicality has two
sources. First, banks’ balance sheets are marked-to-market. Thus, an improvement in
economic activity increases their net worth. Second, banks are active in the management
of their balance sheets: their equity remaining constant, they reallocate the increase
in their net worth to additional borrowing and investment. The leverage therefore
increases. Figure 1 illustrates balance sheet adjustment following an improvement in
economic activity.
Asset Asset DebtDebt
EquityEquity
A AL L
bad times good times
Figure 1: Procyclical leverage - Adrian and Shin (2013)
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(a) Banks located in the euro area (b) Banks located in the euro area
Figure 2: Procyclical leverage of banks, aggregate data.
As banks are active in the management of their balance sheet, their behavior is com-
patible with a Value at Risk (VaR) rule. Adrian and Shin [2013] build a micro-founded
model which links leverage to the VaR rule. Banks adjust their balance sheets to main-
tain a given probability of failure.
Empirically, Adrian and Shin [2008], Gropp and Heider [2009], Kalemli-Ozcan et al.
[2011], Baglioni et al. [2013] study the determinants of bank leverage and its alleged
procyclicality. Only Gropp and Heider [2009] invalidate this relationship.2 In the other
papers, leverage is found to be especially procyclical for investment banks. Figure 2
supports this conclusion, plotting the growth rate of leverage along the growth rate of
total assets. Both for banks located in the euro area (a) and banks located in France
(b), the correlation is positive and significant.
Although the literature generally concludes that leverage is procyclical, it also high-
lights potential differences across geographic locations. According to Kalemli-Ozcan
et al. [2011], European investment banks may show less procyclical leverage than US
banks. This heterogeneity may reflect differences in the composition of banks’ balance
2In Gropp and Heider [2009], banks’ leverage converges to a bank-specific target.
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sheets. As banks use their collateral to raise funds to finance investment, the composi-
tion of their collateral impacts leverage procyclicality. One major issue in this respect
may be the currency denomination of the assets, which has not been incorporated in
theoretical and empirical analyses on leverage procyclicality.
Adrian and Shin [2013] use a contracting model between a representative bank and
its creditor which links the leverage to the domestic state of nature. Their model micro-
founds the VaR Rule but excludes any currency diversification. More recently, Bruno
and Shin [2015] introduce a cross-border network with a global bank, a regional bank
and a local firms. Both the global and the regional bank perform their financial opera-
tions in foreign currency. In contrast, the local firm invests in local currency and raises
debt from the regional bank in foreign currency. Thus, the risk connected with exchange
rate fluctuations is only borne by the local firm and there is no currency diversification
in the banks’ balance sheets.
Since the early 2000s, banks have widely diversified both sides of their balance sheets.
This diversification is related to the banks’ international strategy, as highlighted by Baba
et al. [2009], Borio and Disyatat [2011], Shin [2012], McGuire and Von Peter [2012].
Figure 3 gives a breakdown by currency of external banking positions based on BIS
Data. On both sides of the balance sheet, the US dollar and the euro are the two major
currencies used by reporting banks. Because they affect the value of banks’ collateral,
exchange rate variations should be incorporated in the analysis of leverage dynamics.
The purpose of this paper is to build a theoretical model which allows for currency
diversification of both the assets and the liabilities of a bank. We extend the Adrian
and Shin [2013] model by introducing a second currency of denomination on both sides
of the balance sheet. The bank can borrow and invest in two different currencies: a
3
Figure 3: Currency breakdown of total reporting banks. International positions. BIS.
domestic currency which is the currency of the bank’s equity, and a foreign currency.
The bank’s balance sheet is expressed in domestic currency, which implies a conversion
of foreign assets and liabilities. Two exchange rate regimes are successively studied: a
fixed regime and a floating regime, where the exchange rate depends on the relative
state of nature in the two issuing countries.3
One important result from Adrian and Shin [2013] concerns the VaR rule. As banks
follow a VaR rule, they adjust their balance sheet in order to maintain a constant prob-
ability of default. Introducing currency diversification does not affect the VaR rule or
the mechanism behind the VaR rule. However, depending on the type of shocks and
on the exchange rate regime, balance sheet adjustment will be affected by the degree of
currency diversification. Three specific types of shocks are studied here: (i) a symmetric
shock that does not affect the exchange rate; (ii) an anti-asymmetric shock where the
3In contrast to Bruno and Shin [2015], the exchange rate here is directly linked to the relative state
of nature.
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domestic economy is positively impacted while the foreign economy is negatively im-
pacted; (iii) and an asymmetric shock whereby both economics are affected in the same
direction, but one more strongly than the other.
A positive shock in the home country induces a reaction of increased leverage. If
the shock is symmetric, currency diversification of the balance sheet does not modify
the extent of the leverage procyclical reaction, whatever the exchange rate regime. If
the shock is anti-asymmetric, the risk incurred on foreign assets induces a reaction of
decreased of leverage, although less when the foreign currency depreciates. Finally, if
the shock is asymmetric, procyclicality also diminishes with currency diversification.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the currency
diversification in the Adrian and Shin [2013] framework. Section 3 develops the utility
functions of agents. Two main constraints are derived from utility maximization. Section
4 defines the VaR rule and the reaction in terms of leverage to three economic shocks.
Section 5 concludes and discusses some policy implications.
2 Currency diversification
The model is based on a representative bank’s balance sheet. The bank invests in assets
and raises funds from its creditors. There are two currency denominations for assets
and debts, corresponding to two different countries. The economic states of nature cor-
responding to each economy are known publicly and determine the distribution of asset
returns.
There are two periods T=0,1. Knowing the state of nature and the distribution of
returns, the bank and the creditors agree on the amount to be reimbursed at T=1 in
order to satisfy the VaR rule. This amount therefore defines the level of debt the bank
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is able to raise at T=0.
2.1 The accounting framework
The first agent in this model is a representative bank resembling a European investment
bank. It is domestic in the sense that its equity and its balance sheet are in domestic
currency. The domestic currency (e.g. the euro) is the primary currency. The bank is
risk neutral and equity E is exogenous.4 The second agent is the creditor of the bank,
generally a Money Market Fund or another investment bank. The creditor lends money
to the bank in both currencies. The creditor is also risk neutral. The exchange rate S
is defined as the number of domestic units per unit of foreign currency.
At T=0, the bank raises funds backed by collateral in domestic and foreign cur-
rency (A and A?, respectively). Total assets expressed in domestic currency are equal
to A + SA?. We denote by a the share of assets in domestic currency and (1 − a) the
share of assets in foreign currency. a will vary depending on S.5 Funds are in domestic
and in foreign currency (D and D?, respectively). Thus, total funding from creditors
expressed in domestic currency is equal to D + SD?.
At T=1, the bank receives a total expected return from its investments a(1+r¯)+(1−
a)(1 + r¯?), where r¯ and r¯? are the expected returns from the domestic and the foreign
asset, respectively. Returns depend on the state of nature specific to each currency area,
θ and θ?, respectively. θ and θ? are known publicly from T=0 and they do not change
between the two periods.
At T=1, the bank reimburses its domestic and foreign creditors with respectively D¯
and SD¯?. As θ and θ? are known for the two periods, there is no macroeconomic risk.
4An exogenous equity is in line with the theory of procyclical leverage put forward by Shin.
5See section 4.
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However, the creditor of the bank faces a risk of default on repayment at T=1. The
risk of default depends on the investment choice made by the bank. It is assumed that
D¯ > D and SD¯? > SD? to remunerate the creditor for the default risk. At T=0, the
creditor receives a defaultable debt claim which becomes part of his/her utility function.
The bank’s balance sheets at each period are given in table 1.
T=0, at market value:
Assets Liabilities
A E
SA? D
SD?
T=1, at notional value:
Assets Liabilities
(1 + r¯)A E¯
(1 + r¯?)SA? D¯
SD¯?
Table 1: Bank’s balance sheet at T=0 and T=1
2.2 Leverage
Four debt ratios are defined relative to each funding currency and each period. The
debt ratios at T=0 are:
d =
D
(A+ SA?)
and d? =
SD?
(A+ SA?)
(1)
The corresponding notional values of debt ratios at T=1 are:
d¯ =
D¯
(A+ SA?)
and d¯? =
SD¯?
(A+ SA?)
(2)
E¯ is the equity at the notional value. It is equivalent to the equity at market value
at T=0 plus interest. In other words, E < E¯ and a(1 + r¯) + (1− a)(1 + r¯?) > (d¯+ d¯?).
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The leverage λ is defined as the ratio of total assets to equity, at market value:
λ =
(A+ SA?)
E
=
(A+ SA?)
(A+ SA?)− (D + SD?) =
1
1− (d+ d?) (3)
2.3 Investment strategy
The bank makes an indivisible choice between two types of portfolio. Each portfolio is
composed of an asset in domestic currency and an asset in foreign currency. The weight
of each type of asset is given by a and (1−a). The portfolio’s distribution comes from a
mixture distribution of the two asset return distributions. As each asset return follows
a General Extreme Value (GEV) distribution, the portfolio’s return is also defined by a
GEV distribution. The first portfolio is a good portfolio with a total expected return
of [arH + (1 − a)rH? ], where rH denotes the return from the good domestic asset and
rH? the return from the good foreign asset. The second portfolio is not as good. Its
total expected return [arL + (1 − a)rL? ] is reduced through a parameter k (e.g k > 0)
and it involves more volatility through a parameter m (e.g m > 1).6 The cumulative
distribution of the good asset in domestic currency, the cumulative distribution of the
good asset in foreign currency, the cumulative distribution of the bad asset in domestic
currency, and the cumulative distribution of the bad asset in foreign currency are the
following, where θ, σ and ξ are respectively the location parameter, the scale parameter
and the shape parameter, while z is the iid random variable:
6Introducing an investment choice enables a contract between the creditor and the bank to be mod-
eled, as in Holmstro¨m and Tirole [1997].
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FH(z) = exp
{
−
(
1 + ξ
(
z − θ
σ
))− 1
ξ
}
FH?(z) = exp
{
−
(
1 + ξ
(
z − θ?
σ
))− 1
ξ
}
FL(z) = exp
{
−
(
1 + ξ
(
z − (θ − k)
σm
))− 1
ξ
}
FL?(z) = exp
{
−
(
1 + ξ
(
z − (θ? − k)
σm
))− 1
ξ
}
Using a mixture distribution, the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of total
return when the bank invests in the good portfolio is : 7
FH,H?(z) = a exp
{
−
(
1 + ξ
(
z − θ
σ
))− 1
ξ
}
+ (1− a) exp
{
−
(
1 + ξ
(
z − θ?
σ
))− 1
ξ
}
(4)
If the bank invests in the bad portfolio, the CDF is defined by:
FL,L?(z) = a exp
{
−
(
1 + ξ
(
z − (θ − k)
σm
))− 1
ξ
}
+(1−a) exp
{
−
(
1 + ξ
(
z − (θ? − k)
σm
))− 1
ξ
}
Thus, the total expected return of the portfolio depends on the type of shock the global
economy faces (e.g θ and θ?).
The CDF allows us to define the probability of default α when the bank invests in
the good portfolio. This risk of default appears if the realized total return is below a
given level equal to the total debt ratio at the notional value. Thus, the probability of
7This new framework using a mixture distribution is still compatible with a Second Order Stochastic
Dominance, as in the reference model.
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default α is defined by the cumulative distribution function such that:
α = FH,H?(d¯+ d¯
?)
= a exp
{
−
(
1 + ξ
(
(d¯+ d¯?)− θ
σ
))− 1
ξ
}
+ (1− a) exp
{
−
(
1 + ξ
(
(d¯+ d¯?)− θ?
σ
))− 1
ξ
}
(5)
Since the creditor is uninsured, he/she holds a defaultable debt claim with respect
to the funds they lent to the bank at T=0. This claim will form part of the utility
because it is part of the wealth at T=0. The value of this defaultable debt claim can be
divided into two components: cash (D¯ + SD¯?) and a short position on a put option pi
(Merton [1974]). Since the risk differs between the two types of portfolio, the put option
is specific to each investment choice.
If the bank invests in the good portfolio, we obtain the following put option price:8
piH,H?D¯ + S.D¯
?, A+ SA?) = (A+ SA?).piH,H?(d¯+ d¯
?, 1) ≡ (A+ SA?).piH,H?(d¯+ d¯?)
If the bank invests in the bad portfolio, the price of the put option is:
piL,L?(D¯ + S.D¯
?, A+ SA?) = (A+ SA?).piL,L?(d¯+ d¯
?, 1) ≡ (A+ SA?).piL,L?(d¯+ d¯?)
3 Agents’ participation constraints:
3.1 Creditor’s incentive constraint
The creditor of the bank is risk neutral. He maximizes his total net expected payoff.
8The price of the put option depends on the total amount reimbursed at the end of the period -
D¯ + S.D¯? - and on the total value of assets A+ SA?.
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If the bank invests in the good portfolio, the net expected payoff is the following:
U c+c
?
H,H?(A+ SA
?) = (D¯ + SD¯?)− (A+ SA?)piH,H?(d¯+ d¯?)− (D + SD?)
= (A+ SA?)
[
(d¯+ d¯?)− piH,H?(d¯+ d¯?)− (d+ d?)
]
(6)
The requirement that utility is equal to or higher than 0 provides the first Partici-
pation Compatibility (PC) constraint:
0 ≤ (d¯+ d¯?)− piH,H?(d¯+ d¯?)− (d+ d?) (7)
(d+ d?) = (d¯+ d¯?)− piH,H?(d¯+ d¯?) (PC)
Similarly for an investment in the not so good portfolio:
U c+c
?
L,L? (A+ SA
?) = (A+ SA?)
[
(d¯+ d¯?)− piL,L?(d¯+ d¯?)− (d+ d?)
]
(d+ d?) = (d¯+ d¯?)− piL,L?(d¯+ d¯?) (8)
The PC constraints define the total debt ratio at market value relative to the total debt
ratio at notional value. The latter should be large enough to form an incentive for the
creditor to participate. The higher the reimbursement offered by the bank, the more the
creditor is tempted to lend money at T=0. In this form, the incentive does not depend
directly on the portfolio return specifications.
3.2 Bank’s incentive constraint:
As the bank is risk neutral, it also maximizes its total net expected payoff. The in-
troduction of a second investment currency changes the composition of the bank’s net
expected payoff UBH,H? . In this framework, returns come from assets both in domestic
and in foreign currency. Thus the net expected payoff when the bank invests in the good
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portfolio is equal to:
UBH,H? = A.rH + SA
?rH? + (D + S.D
?)− (D¯ + S.D¯?) + (A+ SA?).piH,H?(d¯+ d¯?)
= (A+ SA?)
[
a.rH + (1− a)rH? + (d+ d?)− (d¯+ d¯?) + piH,H?(d¯+ d¯?)
]
(9)
When the bank invests in the bad portfolio the net expected payoff is equal to:
UBL,L? = A.rL + SA
?rL? + (D + S.D
?)− (D¯ + S.D¯?) + (A+ SA?).piL,L?(d¯+ d¯?)
= (A+ SA?)
[
a.rL + (1− a)rL? + (d+ d?)− (d¯+ d¯?) + piL,L?(d¯+ d¯?)
]
(10)
Assuming that UBH,H? ≥ UBL,L? we get the Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint:
a(rH − rL) + (1− a)(rH? − rL?) ≥ piL,L?(d¯+ d¯?)− piH,H?(d¯+ d¯?) (11)
Where : (rH − rL) = (rH? − rL?)
rH − rL ≥ ∆pi(d¯+ d¯?)
rH − rL = ∆pi(d¯+ d¯?) (IC)
The spreads in returns for all the currency denominations are similar. Thus, the left
hand side (lhs) of the IC constraint can be simplified, as if the bank only held assets in
the domestic currency.9
The IC constraint stipulates that for any economic condition there is a solution
(d¯ + d¯?) that satisfies this identity. The unique solution illustrated in figure 4 comes
from the Second Order Stochastic Dominance (SOSD) between the two mixture distri-
butions and the differential in volatility. pi(z) increases until FH,H?(z) = FH,H?(z) and
decreases after the junction. As shareholders receive returns, (d¯ + d¯?) < (1 + r¯), there
is a unique solution (d¯+ d¯?) which satisfies the IC constraint.
9See the appendix.
12
Figure 4: A unique solution to satisfy the IC constraint
As in Adrian and Shin [2013], the IC constraint also represents the moral hazard
trade-off from Holmstro¨m and Tirole [1997]. The lhs represents the bank’s private ben-
efit from investing in the good portfolio while the right hand side (rhs) is equal to the
private benefit from investing in the bad portfolio (e.g. low effort in the moral hazard
model of Holmstro¨m and Tirole [1997]). With the added PC constraint from the cred-
itor, the bank necessarily invests in the good portfolio where the put option induces
lower prices.
However, in this form it is difficult to obtain a clear definition of (d¯+ d¯?). Additional
assumptions are needed to obtain a closed form solution.
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3.3 Value at Risk
As in Adrian and Shin [2013], it is supposed here that ξ = −1 and m 7→ 1.10 Thus, the
CDF of the mixture functions are of the form:
FH,H?(z) = a exp
{
z − θ
σ
− 1
}
+ (1− a) exp
{
z − θ?
σ
− 1
}
FL,L?(z) = a exp
{
z − (θ − k)
σ
− 1
}
+ (1− a) exp
{
z − (θ? − k)
σ
− 1
}
Hence FL,L? = e
k
σFH,H?
These assumptions allow the rhs of IC to be simplified as follows11
(rH − rL) = ∆pi(d¯+ d¯?)
= (e
k
σ − 1)σFH,H?(d¯+ d¯?) (12)
Because FH,H? is the bank’s probability of default when it invests in the good port-
folio, we can extract the following VaR rule:
α = FH,H?(d¯+ d¯
?) =
(rH − rL)
(ek/σ − 1)σ (13)
As the rhs of (13) does not depend on θ or θ?, the VaR rule holds and the probability
of default α is maintained at the same level for any state of nature and any level of
diversification. The bank adjusts its total debt ratio at T=1 in order to satisfy this
identity.12 Note that the VaR rule focuses on the tail of the distribution. If the tail is
thickened by changes in the state of nature, the bank has to decrease its total debt ratio
10ξ = −1 implies a bounded distribution function on the right side. As the VaR rule focuses on the
left side of the distribution, this assumption is not a problem. m 7→ 1 makes the volatility between the
good and the bad asset comparable. It allows an approximation of a closed form solution.
11See the appendix.
12In a situation where the bank faces a positive shock and does not adjust its total debt ratio at T=1,
the probability of default decreases. The bank receives greater returns, but does not reimburse more.
To satisfy the VaR rule, the bank revises the debt ratio upwards.
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in order to maintain α.
Equation (13) is equivalent to:13
α = aFH? + (1− a)FH? = (rH − rL)
(ek/σ − 1)σ (14)
Hence:
α = exp
{
(d¯+ d¯?)− θ
σ
− 1
}[
a+ (1− a)exp
{
θ − θ?
σ
}]
=
(rH − rL)
(ek/σ − 1)σ (15)
The VaR rule constrains the bank in its adjustment to the states of nature. The
adjustment of (d¯+ d¯?) to the state of nature is:
(d¯+ d¯?) = θ + σ + σln
(
(rH − rL)
(ek/σ − 1)σ
)
− σln
(
a+ (1− a) exp
{
θ − θ?)
σ
})
(16)
The definition of the total debt ratio at the notional value is given by (16). If a = 1,
there is no currency diversification and (d¯+ d¯?) depends on the domestic state of nature.
In contrast, if a = 0, only the foreign state of nature affects (d¯+ d¯?). The procyclicality
of the leverage is derived from the degree of total debt ratio adjustment with respect to
an economic shock.
Proposition 1 Currency diversification does not affect the VaR rule. The bank adjusts
its balance sheet to the state of nature in both currency areas.
13I use the following arrangement: FH? = FH . exp
{
θ−θ?
σ
}
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4 Procyclical leverage with currency diversification
4.1 Economic shocks and exchange rate fluctuations:
As in Adrian and Shin [2013], return depends on the state of nature and on a function
of the shape parameter H(ξ).
The two economies in the model are assumed to be developed and similar, with
perfect capital mobility. In a floating regime, the exchange rate S is determined based
on the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity.14
Hypothesis 1 The definition of S follows the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity.
S = 1 +
rH? − rH
1 + rH
(17)
Where :
rH? =θ
? + σH(ξ)
rH =θ + σH(ξ)
As θ and θ? are known for both periods, the exchange rate does not change between T=0
and T=1. Starting from an initial situation T<0 where θ = θ?, a symmetric increase in
θ and θ? in the two economies does not change the interest rate spread. The exchange
rate is maintained at its initial value S = 1. Now, if the amplitude of a positive shock
is larger in the domestic economy, the domestic currency appreciates and S decreases.
Because the domestic currency appreciates, the converted value of the foreign asset de-
clines, which leads to a larger share of domestic assets relative to total assets: a goes
up. Finally, an anti-asymmetric shock such that θ and θ? move in opposite directions
14The definition of S supposes that shocks are temporary.
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but by the same amount adds to the depreciation of the foreign currency. S falls below
unity and the rise in a is more pronounced.
Implicitly, we assume that the bank does not change the composition of its portfolio,
notwithstanding the shock. Consequently, the changes in a and (1− a) only reflect the
exchange rate effect on converted value, or what we call the valuation effect of currency
diversification. This makes it possible to clearly distinguish the impact of currency
diversification on leverage.
Hypothesis 2 Changes in a and (1− a) only reflect the exchange rate fluctuations.
4.2 A symmetric, positive shock:
If the two economies face a common positive shock, currency diversification does not af-
fect the procyclicality of the leverage. Assets still offer a similar return and the exchange
rate does not fluctuate. As illustrated in figure 5.a), the probability Density Functions
(PDF) of the good portfolio total return shifts to the right. As total expected return
goes up, the bank has to increase its total debt ratio (d¯ + d¯?) to maintain α constant.
The total debt ratio at the notional value goes from (d¯+ d¯?)0 to (d¯+ d¯
?)1 in figure 5.b).
The responsiveness of (d¯ + d¯?) to shocks is not different from that of a single currency
framework.15
Proposition 2 Whatever the exchange-rate regime, currency diversification does not
affect leverage procyclicality when shocks are symmetric.
4.3 An anti-asymmetric shock:
The anti-asymmetric shock is characterized by a positive shock domestically and an
opposite shock in the foreign economy. The foreign asset is subject to increased risk of
15Proof in the appendix.
17
(a) Total portfolio return increases (b) Leverage goes up to satisfy the VaR rule
Figure 5: Global and positive shock: currency diversification does not affect leverage
procyclicality
loss. As illustrated in blue in figure 6.a), the portfolio’s PDF in a fixed exchange rate
regime now includes two modes, one relative to each asset. As the portfolio held by
the bank becomes riskier, the bank has to deleverage to satisfy the VaR rule and the
constant probability of default α. Figure 6.b) shows this new adjustment where (d¯+ d¯?)
goes from (d¯+ d¯?)0 to (d¯+ d¯
?)Fix2 . Leverage becomes counter-cyclical.
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With an anti-asymmetric shock, the appreciation of the domestic currency is clearly
visible. Therefore, the weight of domestic assets increases and the density relative to
this mode goes up, as illustrated in grey in 6.a). As the risk of loss decreases, the portfolio
becomes less risky than the fixed exchange rate regime. The bank still deleverages to
satisfy the VaR rule and α, but the adjustment is less brutal. Total debt ratio moves to
(d¯+ d¯?)Float2 .
Proposition 3 In both exchange rate regimes, an anti-asymmetric shock leads to counter-
cyclical leverage when there is currency diversification.
16Proof in the appendix.
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(a) Risks in portfolio increase (b) Leverage still goes down to satisfy the VaR
rule
Figure 6: Anti-asymmetric shock: a counter-cyclical shock
4.4 An asymmetric and positive shock:
This last shock is positive but the amplitude of the shock is lower in the foreign economy.
Thus, the return on assets differs and the distribution of the portfolio return flattens
when the exchange rate is fixed. As illustrated in Figure 7, the blue PDF of the portfolio
still shifts to the right but the density relative to the mode decreases. Consequently,
the bank still increases (d¯ + d¯?) but to a lesser extent than in the symmetric case. It
reaches (d¯+ d¯?)Fix3 to keep α constant in 7.b).Leverage procyclicality is reduced.
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In a floating regime, procyclicality increases compared to the fixed regime. The asym-
metric shock leads to the appreciation of the domestic currency. As the converted value
of the foreign asset decreases, the domestic asset weight in the portfolio increases. In
Figure 7.a) the grey PDF moves slightly to the right compared to the fixed exchange
rate regime. Thus, bank leverage has to be more procyclical to satisfy the VaR rule and
the constant α in figure 7.b). Total debt ratio rises from (d¯+ d¯?)0 to (d¯+ d¯
?)Float3 .
Regarding the two economic shocks mentioned above, a floating exchange rate regime
always promotes the asset which offers a better return. As the bank follows a VaR rule,
the floating exchange rate regime increases its capacity to raise funds.
17Proof in the appendix.
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(a) Total portfolio return increases less (b) Leverage still goes up to satisfy the VaR rule
Figure 7: Asymmetric and positive shock: currency diversification reduces leverage
procyclicality
Proposition 4 The introduction of a floating exchange rate increases the fund-raising
capacity of the banks when shocks are anti-asymmetric or asymmetric.
Conclusion
Global banks follow global strategies regarding the composition of their assets and liabil-
ities, with marked regional diversification of balance sheets. According to the empirical
literature, this diversification may have an impact on leverage procyclicality. However,
no account has previously been taken of currency diversification, which may affect the
converted value of foreign assets in the balance sheet.
This paper offers the first theoretical model to introduce currency diversification in
global banks’ balance sheets. Based on Adrian and Shin [2013], the model micro-founds
the VaR rule and confirms the active behavior of banks in response to economic shocks.
Thus, depending on the type of shock and on the exchange rate regime, we find that cur-
rency diversification affects leverage adjustment. When shocks are asymmetric, leverage
procycliclality can be reduced if foreign asset returns are less impacted by global finan-
cial cycles. When shocks are anti-asymmetric, the leverage becomes counter-cyclical in
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both exchange rate regimes. When shocks are not correlated, the floating exchange rate
regime promotes the asset which offers a better return. As the bank follows a VaR rule,
the floating exchange rate regime increases its risk-taking capacity.
Two policy implications can be derived from these results. First, as currency diver-
sification is not neutral, regulators should monitor the degree of currency diversification
in addition to geographic diversification. Second, regulators could encourage diversifi-
cation with assets less correlated to global financial cycles. This would reduce leverage
procyclicality whatever the exchange-rate regime.
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5 Appendix
.1 Constant spreads:
As assets only differ in their location parameters, the spreads in interest rate are equal
and constant relative to economic conditions.
a(rH − rL) + (1− a)(rH? − rL?)
= a. (θ + σH(ξ)− (θ − k)−mσH(ξ)) + (1− a) (θ? + σH(ξ)− (θ? − k)−mσH(ξ))
= a. (k − σ(m− 1)H(ξ)) + (1− a) (k − σ(m− 1)H(ξ))
= (k − σ(m− 1)H(ξ))
= Cst (18)
.2 IC development:
The simplifying assumptions give the following IC constraint:
(rH − rL) = ∆pi(d¯+ d¯?) (IC)
=
∫ d¯+d¯?
0
FL,L? dz −
∫ d¯+d¯?
0
FH,H? dz
= e
k
σ
∫ d¯+d¯?
0
FH,H? dz −
∫ d¯+d¯?
0
FH,H? dz
= (e
k
σ − 1)
∫ d¯+d¯?
0
FH,H? dz
= (e
k
σ − 1)σFH,H?(d¯+ d¯?) (19)
.3 Proofs of leverage adjustments:
The general expression of total debt ratio at the notional value is the following:
(d¯+ d¯?) = θ + σ + σln
(
(rH − rL)
(ek/σ − 1)σ
)
− σln
(
a+ (1− a) exp
{
θ − θ?)
σ
})
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Initially, the two economies are similar (e.g θ0 = θ
?
0) and total debt ratio is:
(d¯+ d¯?)0 = θ0 + σ + σln
(
(rH − rL)
(ek/σ − 1)σ
)
When economic shocks are symmetric and positive, θ1 = θ
?
1 and total debt ratio is:
(d¯+ d¯?)1 = θ1 + σ + σln
(
(rH − rL)
(ek/σ − 1)σ
)
Thus, leverage procyclicality is the following:
(d¯+ d¯?)1 − (d¯+ d¯?)0 = θ1 − θ0
Compared to Adrian and Shin [2013] leverage procyclicality is unchanged. When shocks
are symmetric, whatever the exchange-rate regime, currency diversification does not af-
fect leverage procyclicality.
Counter-cyclical leverage is observed when:
(d¯+ d¯?)1 − (d¯+ d¯?)0 < 0
θ1 − θ0 − σln
(
a+ (1− a) exp
{
θ1 − θ?1)
σ
})
< 0
ln
(
1
(1− a)
)
(θ?1 − θ0) < ln
(
a
(1− a)
)
(θ?1 − θ1)
when the exchange-rate regime is fixed, a = (1− a) and the condition becomes:
θ?1 < θ0
This condition is satisfied when shocks are anti-symmetric. Anti-symmetric shocks lead
to counter-cyclical leverage.
23
More generally, leverage procyclicality is reduced when:
(d¯+ d¯?)1 − (d¯+ d¯?)0 < θ1 − θ0
a+ (1− a)exp
{
θ1 − θ?1)
σ
}
> 1
θ1 > θ
?
1
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